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Integrated Network Responsibility in the Gambling Industry:   
Camelot and the UK National Lottery  
Abstract 
This paper introduces the concept of Integrated Network Responsibility which extends 
existing theory (stakeholder theory, supply chain responsibility and network theory) in 
order better to understand the context of a highly regulated controversial industry. Using 
the empirical example of the UK National Lottery and the lottery provider, Camelot, 
Integrated Network Responsibility explains the dynamics of social responsibility in this 
context. Because – among other things - of the ethical issues relating to gambling, the 
vulnerability of consumers and the addictive nature of the product, the legislation and 
regulation prescribes social responsibility requirements in the sector, giving the lottery 
provider agency if awarded the ten-year contract. While suppliers and retailers are 
important partners in this process, it is the wider network which has responsibility for 
upholding the high standards set. Key issues identified in this context relate to the 
management of relative power in the network, extended responsibility and the nature of 
network relationships.  It is proposed that Integrated Network Responsibility may have 
wider applicability to controversial and other sectors, and further research on the concept 
is recommended.    
 
Introduction 
The essence of gambling consists in an abandonment of reason,  
an inhibition of the factors of human control. (Hobson, 1905: p. 138) 
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The gambling industry is morally controversial in popular, religious, and scholarly terms 
as well as being one of the standard screened sectors of the ethical investment industry 
alongside tobacco, alcohol and the military (Schwartz, 2003, p. 195). Gambling has been 
defined variously as “buying a chance to make money; taking a calculated risk because of 
some potential reward; or engaging in an action or series of actions that hopefully result 
in a favourable outcome” (Moore, 1997a: p. 171), encapsulated by the notion of “the 
determination of the ownership of property by appeal to chance” (Hobson, 1905: p. 135).  
 
In this article, we focus on the particular instance of pure gambling, i.e. gambling based 
on pure chance with no skill involved, in the example of the lottery industry. We do this 
by analysing corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a UK lottery organization. As a 
result of the development of national and international lottery programmes in Europe, 
large scale lotteries have arguably been the gateway to gambling for the general public. 
This has seen a successful dissemination of lottery playing in the UK, with 70% of adults 
playing the lottery on a regular basis (National Lottery Commission, 2011) making it the 
most popular form of gambling in the UK (Jones et al, 2009: p. 192), with appeal to both 
men and – unusually – women (Casey, 2006). 
 
Despite a popular resurgence at the end of the last century, lotteries are not a new 
phenomenon in Europe. Early recorded instances include a public lottery in the UK in 
1569 with prizes in the form of plates, tapestries and money, and the lotto originates from 
political elections on which people started betting in Genoa in 1620 (Moore, 1997: p.169-
170). Since then, lotteries have gone in and out of favour in Europe, according to public 
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understandings of morality (Miers, 1996). In the post-War period, gambling has emerged 
as a legitimate, quite tightly regulated industry. The Gambling Act 2005 represents 
somewhat of a relaxation of the regulation around the industry in the UK, but specifies 
corporate social responsibility initiatives as a licence condition for gambling operators 
(Jones et al, 2009), “an interventionist approach to social regulation” (Miers, 1996: p. 
490). Hence CSR has become a critically important element of the gambling industry if 
companies wish to maintain their licence to operate.  
 
We present an analysis of CSR in the controversial sector of gambling. A distinguishing 
feature of the paper is the supply chain and network orientation. The supply chain, in this 
case (and many others) is locked together in its response to social responsibility issues, 
with the lottery provider’s actions and responsibilities enhanced because of their agency 
role in ensuring that regulations are enacted throughout the chain. This approach is not 
one which is a version of the standard stakeholder theory approach where Government 
may be listed as ‘just’ another stakeholder (Freeman, 1984). While a more sophisticated 
network stakeholder perspective is relevant – and indeed is drawn upon in our theoretical 
development, the standard ‘hub and spokes’ model is unhelpful here since all elements of 
the supply chain are required to uphold the government position – by the legal 
requirements as well as by the agency actions of Camelot. 
 
 The paper continues below with a literature review on CSR in supply chains and in the 
gambling sector proposing a new conceptual framework for understanding CSR in 
controversial sectors called Integrated Network Responsibility (INR).  The theoretical 
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contribution to the paper is to extend Spence and Bourlakis’ (2009) work on the 
evolutionary role of CSR in supply chains by using Camelot as an illustrative case of a 
controversial sector where key stakeholders, i.e. Government, are outside of the supply 
chain.  In this article we are therefore suggesting an approach to CSR in controversial 
sectors which is distinctive from less contentious industries where Government influence 
is less pronounced.  
 
Literature Review  
Two literatures are relevant for the development of this paper. The first reviews corporate 
social responsibility and the ethics of gambling. The second area relates to the web of 
stakeholders involved in the lottery sector, and the associated network of social 
responsibilities. We explore this by developing previous work on the evolutionary role of 
CSR in supply chains to capture the concept of Integrated Network Responsibility.  
 
The ethics of gambling and CSR in the lottery sector 
The reason for the focus on the gambling industry as a controversial one is at heart the 
ethics of gambling itself. Lottery gambling is of particular interest because it is imbued 
with a suggestion that it is for fun, and not considered by the public as gambling proper, 
which may indicate why people enjoy the experience of playing the lottery and fail to 
exercise rationality in so doing (Ariyabuddhiphongs, 2011).  This perception of the 
lottery as harmless entertainment is in contrast to its nature as an example of pure 
gambling. This is of special interest in terms of ethics and CSR because the player has no 
opportunity to influence the outcome by skill, and hence is at the liberty of the integrity 
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of the lottery company to ensure a fair process. Indeed, Hobson (1905: p. 138) argues that 
pure gambling of this kind consists of “an abandonment of reason”. This is a claim with 
some justification given that the chances of winning the jackpot have been calculated to 
be in the region of 1 in 14 million (Moore, 1997a: p. 172). The lottery as a subsector of 
the gambling industry is also of interest because it has seen pioneering innovation in 
terms of domesticating gambling by bringing it out of private back rooms and into the 
relatively accessible and innocuous public space of shops and high streets (Casey, 2006). 
Ethical issues identified relate in particular to the lottery’s addictiveness, its attractiveness 
and accessibility for minors, and its disproportionate attractiveness to poorer people. 
Other issues pertain to the distribution of the funds raised, but these are beyond the focus 
of the current paper (for further discussion, see Moore, 1997b). Overall, the ethical issue 
at the heart of lottery playing is the care which must be taken when dealing with 
potentially vulnerable consumers (BiTC, 2006). The importance of the fairness of the 
running of a lottery, quite aside from the ethics of gambling itself, has long been 
acknowledged. In the early 20
th
 Century, Hobson (1905: p. 136) noted that:    
“Where the skilful draftmanship (sic) of a lottery-prospectus allures the dull or 
sanguine reader into staking his money, by deceiving him as to the size of his 
chance of winning, such trickery, though designed to appeal to the gambling 
instinct of investors, is not itself an act or a part of gambling: it is simply fraud, 
though not necessarily fraud in a legal sense”.  
 
Jones et al (2009) take a broad brush approach to identifying CSR issues in the gambling 
industry as relating to the marketplace; the workplace; the environment; and the 
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community. Their findings are rather generic, and accordingly there is a need for a 
focused approach which illuminates more closely the CSR issues concerned. Thus in this 
paper we focus on just one of these aspects, that of the marketplace, referring here 
especially to suppliers and customers of Camelot and developing the supply chain 
perspective. 
  
CSR in supply chains 
Recent burgeoning interest in CSR in supply chains has resulted in a flurry of 
publications which summarise the extant literature related to this field (Amaeshi et al, 
2008;  Spence and Bourlakis 2009; Jiang 2009; Lee and Kim 2009; Park-Poaps and Rees 
2010; Pedersen 2009; Strand 2009). It is not our intention to rehearse these literature 
reviews here, but particularly valuable insights are available from a systematic review by 
Brammer et al  (2011)
1
 which can be summarised as shown in Table One.  
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Table One: Summary of the extant CSR and Supply Chain literature  
Most prevalent 
pressures 





















































protecting brand training/investment in suppliers 




 market access (esp. overseas 
markets) 






  incentives in supply 
relationships 
  shared vision with suppliers 
 
Source: Developed from Brammer et al (2011). Reasons given are in order of 
significance in the reviewed literature.  Legislative/ government factors particularly 
relevant to the UK lottery sector have been shown in bold italics.  
 
In Brammer et al’s summary, government and legislative influences are in no cases 
shown to be the most significant. We argue that in the highly regulated controversial 
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industries example, this is not representative. This is because regulators are in a position 
to rescind the right to operate and might indeed use that power. This drives the nature of 
CSR, re-configuring hard-law regulations into soft-law codes with which suppliers 
should comply (Sobczak 2006: 228). Brammar et al (2011) note examples of regulated 
CSR contexts for supply chains motivating positive behaviour in relation to the 
environmental protection laws in terms of  operations and production (Wexing, 2008) and 
waste reduction and recycling legislation in logistics (Lau and Wang, 2009). It is notable 
however, that government legislation/regulation ranks highly as a driving pressure for 
CSR in supply chains in Table One. Not withstanding this, legislation is not a key 
facilitator for CSR (see third column). This gap – between regulation as an external 
pressure and as a facilitator for CSR -  supports the need for a closer understanding of 
how CSR is enacted in highly regulated contexts.  
 
Some research studies have focused on the CSR supply chain perspective in order to seek 
to develop the notion of CSR across the chain rather than looking at single or vertical 
dyadic perspectives on CSR. Müller et al (2009) and van Tulder et al (2008) each argue 
for full supply chain perspectives, focusing particularly in each case on standards or 
codes as the mechanism for transferring standards throughout the chain. Spence and 
Bourlakis (2009) take a different perspective, and it is this which will be built upon here 
because of the distinctive ‘whole chain’ / network approach which they advocate.  
 
Taking a case illustration of a supermarket in the UK, Spence and Bourlakis (2009) 
describe a move away from isolated individual organizations acting out their CSR 
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unilaterally. They describe an evolution of this being the Corporate Social Watchdog 
(CSW), where a single organization becomes responsible for implementing a guiding 
standard of social responsibility throughout the chain. Such Corporate Social Watchdogs 
are those powerful organizations which add social standards to the factors which they 
seek to manage in others in their chain. In some cases they may set the standards, audit 
suppliers, decide on penalties for non-compliance, and ultimately delist non-conforming 
organizations. Thus they in effect take on the role of moral arbiter over others in the 
chain. Spence and Bourlakis also introduce the Supply Chain Responsibility concept that 
indicates the full transfer of responsibility for standards across the chain.  Its features 
include a commitment by all chain members and a genuine partnership approach where 
all chain members have an open two-way flow of communication and information 
sharing, aiming to allow the joint planning of goals, objectives and supply chain activities 
between these members. 
 
We propose that the CSR and CSW stages of the Spence and Bourlakis framework are 
also relevant for Camelot. They develop this further arguing for full Supply Chain 
Responsibility (SCR). While this is a distinctive step forward, and continues to have 
relevance for organizations which genuinely seek to act as partners and work on common 
challenges in unison with business partners, there remain critical unexplained elements if 
the simplified supply chain is the focus. Not least the exclusion of influential stakeholders 
outside the chain. This is the departure point for us to consider a wider, network 
orientation which is developed in the subsequent section.  
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Camelot, for example, operates in a CSR environment that goes beyond the Supply Chain 
Responsibility perspective. It is also guided by other stakeholders outside the chain, 
including public interest groups, the media and local communities. Most fundamentally 
of all is the influence of government and regulation via the National Lottery Commission. 
For this reason none of the unilateral CSR, the CSW nor the SCR perspective adequately 
explains the nature and processes influencing social responsibility initiatives and 
responsibilities for the lottery provider.  
 
The decision to introduce the National Lottery in the UK was a departure from traditional 
policy in the area of commercial gambling, where successive governments were only 
involved in gambling in terms of its arms-length regulation (Miers, 1996: p. 490). Under 
the National Lottery system set up by an Act of Parliament in 1993, the National Lottery 
Commission was established which is closely involved with setting detailed parameters 
for the operation of the lottery. The Commission is charged with ensuring that players are 
treated fairly; the nation’s interest in the Lottery is protected; and the operator is 
motivated to maximize the enjoyment and benefits that the Lottery brings to the Nation. 
In addition, statutory duties to: ensure that the National Lottery, and every lottery that 
forms a part of it, is run with all due propriety; ensure that the interests of every 
participant in the Lottery are protected; and subject to these two duties, to maximize the 
proceeds of the National Lottery (National Lottery Commission, 2011). To be specific, 
regulatory requirements are set out for the National Lottery provider under the following 
rubrics (National Lottery Commission, 2003), and further details are given in relation to 
Camelot in Table Two. Regulatory requirements cover the Control Environment; Lottery 
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IT Systems; Game operation; Prize validation and payment; Consumer Protection; 




Table Two: Camelot’s Stakeholders and Regulatory influence thereon  
Stakeholder Group Mission Statement CSR commitments Example Corresponding to NLC Regulatory 
imperatives 
(1) Our people – 761 full-time 
equivalent  employees working in 
UK 
We need skilled people at every level. Our 
goal is to create a high performance culture 
where employees feel valued, creative and 
highly motivated. 
Organisational change including 
share sale and transformation 
Health, wellbeing and morale 
All persons involved in key aspects of the National 
Lottery’s operations must be “fit and proper"  
There must be appropriate levels of authority with 
accountability which has regard to levels of risk  
Performance indicators must be set which ensure the 
monitoring of key operations and  
identify developments that require corrective action  
(2) Players – The 70% of UK 
adults who regularly play 
National Lottery games 
We strive to offer innovative and entertaining 
games while protecting consumers 
andmaintaining player trust in integrity of the 
National Lottery  
Integrity of National Lottery 
operations 
Clear game rules and odds of 
winning 
Reliability of services in store and 
customer service support 
Aftercare for winners 
Consumer protection 
Protection of winnings 
Comprehensive information about the National 
Lottery, including descriptions of games, the chances 
of winning, the value of prizes, number of prizes 
remaining, guides for players and the game rules 
must be made readily available to players  
Winners of prizes above £10K must be offered, free 
of charge, information on relevant financial matters, 
whilst for prizes above £250K an appropriate 
advisory service must be offered free of charge.  
(3) The Public We want to maximise returns for good causes 
in ways that garner public trust and uphold 
our responsibilities to protect the public 
Integrity of the National Lottery 
Returns to good causes 
Responsible play 
An adequate system must be in place to prevent, 
detect, record and investigate fraud or security 
incidents of any type relating to the National Lottery  
(4) Public interest groups – 
Academic institutions, research 
bodies, charities, campaign 
groups, religious / welfare 
groups, organisation for problem 
gamblers 
We want to be trusted for our commitment to 
the highest standards of responsible play 
Continuous improvement in 
responsible play 
The licensee must apply measures that prevent 
children under the age of 16 from selling or buying 
tickets and discourage excessive play  
(5) Government – Members of 
Parliament, the Department of 
Culture, Media and Sport, the 
Treasury  
We want to be trusted to operate the Lottery 
in an efficient and socially responsible way 
and to benefit from legislation that supports 
this aim. 
We also want to work with Government to 
maximise policy opportunities to assist in 





Good cause funding 
Responsible lobbying 
 
NLC does not seek to guide Government 
(6) Regulator – The National 
Lottery Commission 
We believe better regulation will help to 
generate more funds for the good causes 
Compliance with regulation and 
integrity of operations 
NLC does not seek to guide itself 
(7) The National Lottery 
Distribution Bodies – The 
National Lottery Promotions 
We continue to work with the distribution 
bodies and NLPU to ensure all constituent 
parts of The National Lottery share 
Good cause funding 
Promotion of funding 
NLC does not seek to guide the Distribution Bodies 
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Unit (NLPU) information and understanding  
(8) Media  We provide timely, accurate and interesting 
information to the media and seek to develop 
a relationship based on trust and open 
communication 
Commercial initiatives 
Publicity surrounding winners, 
new games, and rollovers 
There must be a long term marketing strategy in place 
which is communicated to the NLC and which is 
effective in encouraging all potential players  
to participate in lottery games, but not excessively, 
provided they are 16 or over  
A sufficient range of media must be used in 
advertising to ensure desirable coverage and 
frequency targets are met  
The licensee must undertake a comprehensive range 
of public relations activity  
(9) Suppliers – Around 800 large 
and small companies from which 
we buy goods and services 
We aim to work in partnership with suppliers 
and to be consistent and responsible in our 
behaviour. 
Fair treatment and financial 
stability 
Supplier integrity 
The licensee shall secure that contractors approved by 
the NLC have adequate systems of internal control.  
The licensee and its appointed agents must comply in 
all respects with the Advertising and Sales Promotion 
Code of Practice and use reasonable endeavours to 
ensure that suppliers and third parties also comply  
(10) Local communities – Home 
to our employees local charities, 
voluntary and community groups  
We want our community investment to 
embody our values, support our business 
objectives and build rewarding relationships 
with the areas where we operate 
The impacts of our contributions NLC does not seek to guide communities 
(11) Retailers – Over 28,500 
retailers, split roughly 60:40 
between small independents and 
large multiples 
We aim to work in partnership with our 
retailers to ensure they supply National 
Lottery products with integrity and support us 
to maximise returns to the good causes 
Reliable technology 
Availability of scratchcard supply 
Frequency of face to face contact 
with Camelot 
Support to maximise sales and 
commission 
Fair retailer selection 
Retailer integrity 
The licensee must ensure that retailers are given 
training which makes it clear that they must not sell 
tickets to under 16s or to those who play excessively  
The licensee must ensure that clear criteria are 
employed for retailers to qualify for selection and de-
selection 
The licensee and all its appointed retailers who sell 
tickets for any game in the Lottery must be familiar 
with the games and their operation, the procedures for 
collection and payment of cash and the codes of 
practice   
(12) Shareholders  We want our shareholders to be proud of 
Camelot and recognise our high level of 
accountability. In return we aim to provide a 
satisfactory return on investment 
Risk and company performance 
Share sale 
NLC does not seek to guide shareholders 
Source: Expanded from Camelot Group (2011a) and National Lottery Commission Regulatory Imperatives (2003)
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As is evident from Table Two which summarises the stakeholder responsibilities 
according to Camelot, the vast majority of CSR commitments shown in the third column 
can be linked directly to regulatory imperatives established by the National Lottery 
Commission. Given the foregoing discussion, we argue that unilateral, watchdog and 
supply chain perspectives on CSR are inadequate lenses with which to understand social 
responsibility in the lottery and gambling sector as an example of a contentious industry. 
In the following section we develop the concept of Integrated Network Responsibility 
(INR) to explaining the CSR perspective in these cases and we also justify further our 
rationale.  
 
Integrated Network Responsibility 
In general, the network paradigm has been discussed from various scholars providing a 
plethora of perspectives. In his seminal work, Jarillo (1988) notes that “a network is a 
constellation of firms linked together in a market by goal congruence and trust in order to 
encourage committed actors to share benefits”. Under this vein, Lewis and Slack (2003) 
stress that the network paradigm promotes the consideration and understanding of 
competitive and cooperative forces, helps in identifying particularly significant 
relationships, and encourages a fundamental focus on long-term issues essentially 
suggesting a new way of ‘doing business’ both upstream and downstream. Other scholars 
have extended the network paradigm further by introducing the elements of 
interconnectedness and complexity (Håkansson and Johanson, 1993). We believe that all 
these issues are of particular importance in this paper considering the continuous, and 
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multiple interactions between network members (Camelot, suppliers, retailers, other 
stakeholder groups). But more importantly, the last two elements (interconnectedness and 
complexity) can justify our rationale for introducing in this paper the concept of 
Integrated Network Responsibility. We believe that the ‘supply chain’ concept is not 
adequate to cover the full complexity and interactive nature of relationships between 
various members of Camelot’s network with Figure 1 illustrating our thinking. 
Specifically, each dot in Figure 1 represents a supply chain firm (or actor) that could be a 
supplier, a retailer firm, Camelot, other stakeholder groups etc. At this stage, suppliers 
and retailers start forming an individual, dyadic relationship with Camelot. However, it is 
quite unusual for any firm (and Camelot) to interact only with a single supplier / retailer 
and to be a member of a dyadic supply chain only. Firms are more likely to be connected 
directly and indirectly with various other firms, most normally under a non-linear and 
complex relationship (connected relations). Ellis (2011) also mentions the metaphor of a 
“net” to capture the various links up, down and across the network that is more 
appropriate in this paper considering the ‘web’ or ‘net’ of activities, interactions and 
influential relationships between the members involved.  
Figure 1: From Supply Chain to Network Management 
Source: Ritter et al (2004) 
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In turn, network and cluster orientations on CSR have been explored to a small degree 
previously, including through work on social capital; however, they have been focused on 
small and medium sized enterprises primarily (e.g. Fuller and Tian, 2006; Murillo and 
Lozano, 2009; Russo and Perrini, 2009; Von Weltzien Høivik and Shankar, 2011). Such 
work tends to study geographical regions and collaboration within an industry by peers, 
i.e. other SMEs. For the aforementioned reasons, we believe that the framework by 
Spence and Bourlakis (2009) analyzing stand-alone CSR, Corporate Social Watchdogs 
and Supply Chain Responsibility, or even the peer group Cluster responsibility can not 
adequately explain CSR in a highly regulated controversial and complex industry like the 
lottery. Based on the above, Figure 2 illustrates a more robust framework that contains 
the evolution from CSR to CSW to the INR dimension and it shows the 



















Note: The numbers given in Figure 2 correspond to network members (and stakeholder 
groups) stated in Table 2. In the dotted line, the whole Network is included and in the 
centre, the last stage – Integrated Network Responsibility is noted.  
Source: The Authors 
 
Thus, the Integrated Network Responsibility is the coherent attention to social 
responsibility issues by members of a network with concern about the social performance 


































stakeholder management and dialogues perspectives in this approach, but they have a 
crucial difference. From the point of view of Integrated Network Responsibility, no 
single organization is at the centre of the stakeholder diagram. Nevertheless an 
approximation may be drawn to Freeman’s network of stakeholders which appears early 
on in his work on the topic but is rarely referred to, the focus instead remaining on the 
single organization at the hub of a range of organizational stakeholders positioned like 
spokes on a wheel (Freeman, 1984). In the particular case in question, if anything it is the 
NLC who are the relatively powerful arbiter in the network through regulation and the 
licensing process itself. Hence, the NLC on behalf of government has the most influential 
role in the proposed INR and its influential “network position” (Wilkinson and Young, 
2002) is further stressed in Figure 2 by placing that actor / government separately from 
the other network members.  
 
Camelot act not at the centre of the picture, but as agents of government policy who also 
seek to maximise profit for shareholders as well as attend to their constraints in terms of 
maximising contributions to good causes such as funding for sports, heritage, health, 
education and arts events as well as having a duty of care for consumers. The National 
Lottery has raised over £24 billion for the good causes and more than 330,000 projects 
have been supported (Camelot Group, 2011c). More specifically, Camelot is 
implementing and successfully adhering to the government policy and to other CSR 
guidelines within its network of suppliers and customers under an integrated fashion, 
hence, the proposed Integrated Network Responsibility stage. This involves forward and 
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backward integration of these CSR guidelines and policy towards retailers and suppliers 
respectively (see Figure 2).  
 
In the next section we examine whether Camelot has also taken the initiative to extend 
their responsibility in that network in that backward and forward integration fashion. At 
the same time, we will examine other related issues including the power element that 
Camelot may enjoy in that network and the nature of relationships between Camelot and 
its suppliers / retailers which can be considered as part of a relationship “atmosphere” 
(Håkansson, 1982). The above are of key importance in the network literature and 
numerous network scholars have analysed them. For example, Anderson et al. (1994) 
have illustrated the role of power in networks whilst Håkansson and Ford (2002) have 
analysed the existence, type, form and connections within network relationships. Based 
on work by Doz and Hamel (1998) and Gummesson (1999), Möller and Halinen (1999) 
outlined the relational practices followed by major retailers including the sharing of 
information and extending their practices (and responsibility) to the whole distribution 
network.  
 
The above issues will be examined in the empirical work and our findings will be 
supported by specific Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) measuring various INR-related 
aspects for both suppliers and retailers. These KPIs could also provide further evidence of 
the ways that Camelot has extended, interpreted and opetionalised its responsibility in 
that network. Overall, the rationale of our suggestion for the Integrated Network 
Responsibility concept is supported by Brammer et al (2011: 51) who conclude that there 
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are three areas for research on CSR/sustainability and supply chains: research on the 
performance implications of sustainability in supply chains; theory development; 
comparative empirical research. This paper constitutes a contribution to theory 
development by in particular introducing the INR concept as of relevance to ‘contentious’ 
or even complex industry such as the gambling one and more specifically, we use the 
case of Camelot in the context of the UK national lottery to illustrate that concept. 
Overall, the paper aims to shed light on the role and importance of this concept for 
Camelot and its network members, especially suppliers and retailers; it also analyses the 
role and influence of other key issues within that network such as power, extended 
responsibility and nature of relationships.    
 
Methodology 
A qualitative case study methodology was employed in our empirical work as the 
objective was to support the detailed exploration of the case in hand and to provide 
extensive knowledge of a specific context (Eisenhardt, 1989). Information was generated 
via interviews with key informants / decision makers in organisations which is a standard 
interrogative method in case research (see Miles and Huberman, 1994). Over nine 
interviews were carried out with people from the case study companies, suppliers, 
retailers, and industry experts (see Table 3). In addition, the wider project included 
interviews with managers and policy makers from relevant organisations such as the 
Chartered Institute of Purchasing and Supply, the Federation of Small Business and the 
Office of Government Commerce. 
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Table 3: Participants of Interviews 
Organisation  Role  Organisation Role 
Camelot Head of Supplier 
Development 
 Retail Multiple Manager and Co-
chair of Camelot 
Retailers Forum 
Camelot Director of Sales  Supplier to Camelot Managing Director 
Camelot CSR Advisor  Supplier to Camelot Managing Director 
Camelot Retail Planning 
Manager 
 Owner of Retail SME 
and National Federation 
for Retail Newsagents 
National President 
of Federation 
Camelot Warehouse and 
Distribution Manager 
   
 
These interviews were recorded, transcribed and analysed to provide a holistic picture of 
the company with input from different perspectives in relation to the issues under 
examination. In addition, a thematic analysis was followed for the qualitative data 
analysis (Banister et al., 1994) and key themes were identified in the relevant literature 
that is a typical approach in this discipline. Overall, the “thematic” analysis provides a 
coherent manner of organising primary data and enables data to speak for itself (Banister 
et al., 1994). In the next section, we provide few important quotes from the interviewees 
primarily because they are of some value in defining, supporting or elaborating the 
researcher’s interpretation of events (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Finally, we will support 
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our findings with relevant Key Performance Indicators in relation to INR for both 
retailers and suppliers.  
 
An Illustrative Example of Integrated Network Responsibility: Camelot  
The Camelot Group is the only provider to have operated the UK National Lottery to 
date. The licensing process has itself been controversial, with challenges around the high 
profits made by Camelot and the nature of it as a profit-making company – rather than 
charitable – organization.  Nevertheless, it has three times been awarded the license, each 
time under increasingly stringent rules and regulations for operating practices set by the 
UK Nation Lottery Commission and with the third National Lottery License won for 
2009-2019 (Anon, 2007); in March 2010, Camelot was acquired by the Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan for the amount of £389 million (BBC News, 2011).  
 
Camelot’s own interpretation of its social responsibilities are outlined in its code and 
relate to Corporate Governance; Respect for the Individual; Risk Management and 
Control; Health and Safety; Equal Opportunities; Fraud; Staff Consultation; Advertising, 
Sales Promotions and Corporate Communications; Government Relations; Political 
Contributions; Player Services; Preventing Excessive and Under Age Play; Corporate 
Responsibility Reporting; Environment; Community Involvement;  Business Monitoring 
and Control. (Camelot Code, 2010).  
 
Thus Camelot’s responsibilities are diverse and substantial, illustrating that it is part of a 
wide network of stakeholders including those shown in Table Two. They are also charged 
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with a duty of care to its players and winners, and with maintaining public trust and 
confidence in The National Lottery” (Camelot Group, 2011b).  According to BiTC 
(2006), Camelot soon understood when given the first licence that “it would be heavily 
regulated on the one hand, and would carry great visibility and consequently great public 
expectations on the other. This meant that it needed to make a clear assessment of its 
potential impact and to show that it could mitigate any negatives”. 
 
The above illustrates the ways Camelot has approached INR within its network. Further 
analysis is given in the following pages where we will examine three key aspects within 
that network including power, extended responsibility and nature of relationships.    
 
Dealing with the balance of power at various levels in the network 
First tier suppliers for Camelot are principally based in the UK and it has approximately 
800 suppliers with the top 50 accounting for about 80% of spend. That spend involves a 
range of items such as play slips, tickets and terminals as well as information technology, 
security, customer services, marketing and media services. Camelot supplies to over 
28,800 retailers including the big supermarkets but about 60% are small independent 
retailers and Camelot seeks to ensure that all these customers are treated fairly and have a 
clear input into decision making which affects them.  
 
Nevertheless, it is evident that Camelot retains a vast amount of power with its suppliers 
and retailers and this is recognised fully by their suppliers: “Camelot are far more aware 
(than other customers) of the power that they hold and the organisation that they are and 
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I think that they really do believe and live the spirit of partnership that they so frequently 
talk about” (Managing Director of a Supplier to Camelot) 
 
Many of these suppliers are small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) and Camelot 
could constitute a major part of their revenues. Camelot protects these firms from being 
disadvantaged by adopting an approach whereby no more than 20% of a supplier’s 
turnover should be with Camelot. This is done to avoid supplier reliance on Camelot and 
potential bankruptcy for them if the relationship ceases for any reason bearing in mind 
the limited nature of each license period. Actually Camelot has set a target to make sure 
that no more than 10% of suppliers rely on them for more than 20% of their business.  
 
Considering the heightened power of major UK supermarkets as retailers, Camelot tries 
to ensure that independent retailers retain a significant amount of the business and at the 
same time maintain high levels of access for all players. Camelot aims to maintain a 
balance of 60/40 in favour of independents in line with retail trends and it is something 
that: “historically the company were very keen to kind of protect the independent sector” 
(Director of Sales, Camelot). 
 
In 2009/10, this was almost achieved as Camelot had a 58/42 ratio in favour of 
independents (Camelot Group 2011c).  The Co-Chair of the Retailer Forum (a 
consultative body which represents lottery retailers from across all retail sectors and 
discusses policy developments, challenges facing retailers, new games, retailer selection 
and strategies to prevent underage and excessive play) believes that for some of the 
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smaller retailers, the Lottery is what makes the difference between survival and going out 
of business. This is not only because of the money earned directly but also because of the 
extra footfall brought into the shop.   
 
Irrespective of the power issue, suppliers are keen on timely payment and Camelot is 
committed to paying within a maximum of sixty days. The number of invoices paid to 
term is regularly monitored and published annually in the Corporate Responsibility 
Report (87% for 2009/10, Camelot Group 2011c). With small retailers, payment terms 
have been adjusted in the past as these retailers found it hard to pay for packs of scratch 
cards before they had been sold.   
 
Extended network responsibility when managing suppliers and retailers 
The Head of Supplier Development at Camelot follows a risk management approach in 
terms of social, ethical and environmental impacts. Although the primary objective is “to 
secure value for money”, making the network of suppliers aware of (and responsible for) 
potential operational risks and impacts is key to Camelot. In addition, Camelot developed 
a supplier self-assessment relationship survey helping to identify high risk industry 
groups based on social, ethical and environmental risk assessment of their network and 
categorised suppliers who fell into these groups accordingly. More importantly: “Results 
from the annual supplier relationship survey help to push forward our CSR or corporate 
responsibility agenda and extend our thinking to suppliers” (Head of Supplier 
Development, Camelot)  
 
 29
Camelot wishes then to see suppliers meeting its standards and encourages its suppliers to 
check the standards of their sub-suppliers too (tier 2 suppliers in Camelot’s network). In 
many occasions, Camelot actively supports suppliers towards that. A major supplier of 
payslips and receipt rolls for Camelot noted that:“The Supplier Relationship Manager 
and Head of Supplier Development from Camelot went with me to meet a potential sub-
supplier of recycled paper (tier 2) and the input from Camelot was very useful for the 
appointment of that sub-supplier” (Managing Director of a Supplier to Camelot).  
 
The selection of retailers to take on a National lottery terminal is highly competitive. 
When a terminal becomes available, Camelot reviews the opportunities available 
according to the latest market information and to all possibilities across the retail estate 
rather than a particular geographical area. Subsequently, Camelot selects those retailers 
who offer the best opportunity to maximise sales and returns to good causes. Camelot 
does not operate a one for one policy in selecting a new retailer: so if a lottery retailers 
closes down, a neighbouring retailer will not necessarily get their terminal; conversely, if 
they believe there is sufficient player demand in a particular area they may select retailers 
close to one another – there is no ‘waiting list’. An interesting comment was given by the 
Director of Sales at Camelot: “We look at its proximity to things like schools and if there 
is proximity near a school we will take it out so we won’t select it. If the selection means 
that it will increase and improve the access for a local disabled centre or old aged 
people’s home or a community or a rural community then all is taken into account”.  
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In addition, Camelot have committed to having up to 1000 retailers designated as 
Community Outlets. These are often in rural communities and they qualify by location, to 
ensure that communities in each post code in the UK have access to a lottery terminal and 
to make sure that the removal of a terminal would not cause significant problems for the 
community to access the lottery.  
 
Nature of relationship 
INR implies that there is a two way communication flow with both suppliers and retailers 
having the opportunity to give (and receive) feedback when they deal with Camelot. 
Specifically, suppliers give feedback through an annual supplier survey that covers 
specific areas such as certification, company policies, satisfaction levels with the Camelot 
relationship and with 98% of suppliers being satisfied (2009/10, Camelot Group 2011c).  
Camelot has also encouraged further input by a medium-sized firm supplying the 
playstation point of sale equipment resulting to the supplier having a decisive input in 
Camelot’s storage operations. The Managing Director of that supplier stated that the 
relationship is the closest the company has with any of its customers and he puts that 
down to the efforts made by Camelot and because:“Camelot have allowed us to get 
closer to them”. This is confirmed by a manager from Camelot mentioning:“It has been 
a very open, frank and honest relationship on both sides” (Warehouse and Distribution 
Manager, Camelot). Similar positive findings were noted for many other suppliers to 
Camelot.   
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Feedback from retailers is important to Camelot too. According to the latest retailer 
relationship survey, 94% of retailers said they were satisfied with Camelot’s approach to 
the relationship in 2009/10 (Camelot Group 2011c) and it is perceived as a partner that 
listens, collaborates, seeks feedback, acts on it and consults. A primary example of 
Camelot acting on feedback (and an example of INR) is the Sales Improvement 
Programme (SIP). Here, any retail outlets performing below the minimum weekly sales 
target set by Camelot, are put on SIP, a thorough programme to help retailers, through 
extra training, raise their weekly revenue from the lottery, with a threat of having their 
lottery terminals removed only as a very last resort if they do not meet their targets. In 
consultation with the Retailer Forum, Camelot reduced the baseline of sales at which an 
outlet is put on SIP from £1400 per week to £1000 per week. 
 
Furthermore, Camelot has ensured transparent, visible and honest processes and practices 
with its business partners. A key informant from Camelot mentioned the impact of that 
on the supplier supply chain noting: “Sixteen percent of our suppliers felt that our 
business approach and our social and environmental commitment has led to changes in 
their supply chain or has entered their supply chain” (Corporate Responsibility Advisor, 
Camelot) 
 
Suppliers interviewed indicated that Camelot had contributed to building relationships 
based on trust because of a willingness to disclose information, not just require it from 
others. According to BiTC (2006), Camelot has invested a large amount of resources to 
‘educate’ and ‘train’ its retailers and suppliers to follow its business approach. A good 
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example of this education is the Operation Child initiative: “Operation Child is a 
programme that we committed to undertake as a business. We conduct 10,000 retail visits 
a year across all sectors using children that are older than 16 look younger than 16 and 
it is a test purchasing scheme and it is a way of testing the measures and the control that 
retailers have in place not to sell tickets to under 16s. If retailers sell tickets more than 
three times during these visits then there is a severe penalty” (Director of Sales, 
Camelot) 
 
This initiative had a major impact and it has been very successful. Nevertheless, it is not 
an initiative that is undertaken by firms in comparable sectors: “If you go into the drinks 
industry, you don’t see the big breweries or alcopop companies or spirit companies 
sending out people to see off licences or supermarkets serve these people drink. And you 
certainly don’t see it with the large tobacco companies....You find that the police and 
Trading Standards end up doing this job on behalf of alcohol and cigarettes, whereas 
Camelot actually do it themselves for the Lottery!”  (Manager of Retailer and Co-chair 
of Camelot Retailers Forum) 
   
Based on the above, we believe that Camelot has followed the INR approach, responding 
– necessarily – to the National Lottery Commission regulatory imperatives to address the 
above issues. Our identification of issues is complemented further by Camelot’s opwn 
data and measurement of social responsibility in their supply network through a plethora 
of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) to monitor and ensure the fair and responsible 
management of its dealings with suppliers and retailers in that network. Table 4 provides 
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the results for KPIs in relation to INR for both suppliers and retailers. These results 
support the findings of our empirical work and justify further the notion that Camelot has 
extended, interpreted and opetionalised its responsibility in their supply network by using 
various mechanisms and processes (including KPIs). 
 
Table 4: Camelots KPIs in relation to Integrated Network Responsibility  
Issue assessed Key Performance 
Indicators 






Retailers satisfied with 
Camelot’s approach to the 
relationship (%) 








87.0 90.0 94.0 
Ratio of independent to 













Retailers who refused to sell 
to an Operation Child test 
purchaser on first visit (%) 






Response to retailer 
selection request (%) 




Response to retailer 
correspondence (%) 




Suppliers satisfied with 
overall relationship with 
Camelot (%) 
80.0 98.0 97.0 97.0 
Source: Camelot Group (2011c; 2011d); Interviews with Key Informants  
 
It must be acknowledged that Camelot, by virtue of the licence to operate granted by the 
National Lottery Commission, retains power in its network, despite the company stating 
that it did not wish to exploit this. Here there is an unavoidable truth – Camelot, with 
major national brand status, holds the dominant power position in most of its network 
relationships, notwithstanding the stated commitment to the partnership approach. 
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Indeed, in the Procurement and Tendering Policy, there is clear statement of the Camelot 
Group policy “Take full but fair advantage of its position as a large purchaser.” (Camelot 
Group, 2010, p. 3). 
 
Conclusion  
In this paper we have extended the concept of supply chain responsibility to introduce 
Integrated Network Responsibility. We have developed this new concept in response to 
the complex situation in the controversial sector of the UK National Lottery. In this 
sector, an Act of Parliament and subsequent regulatory imperatives set high social 
responsibility standards for the monopolistic lottery operator. Going beyond a standard 
stakeholder model, Camelot acts as an agent of the State, and is required to manage its 
own powerful position in the network and use its pivotal position to promote 
responsibility among network members. This agency is extended to suppliers, retailers 
and employees, in the pursuit of protecting (vulnerable) consumers and the public (via 
public interest groups) and maximizing money generated for good causes. As a company, 
it is also subject to the need to maximize the return on investment for its shareholders. 
 
Integrated Network Responsibility draws from both supply chain and stakeholder 
approaches to understanding organizational responsibility. However, it goes beyond each 
of these in important ways. A supply chain responsibility approach is too narrow, taking 
into account primarily suppliers and customers, but disregarding the important 
involvement in this controversial industry of the public (including those not playing the 
lottery), public interest groups, the recipients of lottery money and the regulatory 
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framework (and Government) which dictates the operational responsibilities. Similarly, 
the standard stakeholder approach is inadequate in the national lottery case because of the 
utterly dominant role which Government play via legislation and regulation in not just 
influencing but controlling the literal license to operate of the national lottery provider 
and the framework of operation. Government does not just have a stake in the national 
lottery, it controls its existence. A different kind of analysis than that presented here 
might put the Government at the centre of a stakeholder map and make Camelot one of 
its stakeholders, but that is beyond the purpose of this particular paper.  
 
To summarize, Integrated Network Responsibility constitutes a response to social 
responsibility requirements where a complex set of interrelationships at the macro, meso 
and micro level must be acted upon and engaged with in order to achieve a social 
responsibility goal. In such examples, unilateral, dyadic or linear social responsibility 
dynamics are inadequate to describe practice, or resolve mutual social responsibility 
challenges and affect positive social change. Such multiparty social responsibilities 
require an Integrated Network Responsibility framework in order to be addressed 
successfully.  
 
Integrated Network Responsibility concept has wider application than national lotteries. 
We propose that it is likely to be relevant in the context of controversial industries such 
as the tobacco industry, gambling, alcohol, fast food industries (with a common factor of 
potentially addictive products), but it may well be extended with some adaptation to other 
problematic or even contentious sectors with additional perspectives such as 
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pharmaceutical, weapons manufacture, gas and oil extraction. Some of the antecedents 
for Integrated Network Responsibility might accordingly include: 
 Vulnerable or potentially vulnerable consumers (e.g. social services) 
 Industries supplying addictive products (e.g. tobacco) 
 Monopoly situations (e.g. the National Transmission System for gas) 
 Highly profitable industries (e.g. financial services) 
 Complex relationships between powerful corporations seeking to influence 
government and NGOs by self-regulation and lobbying (e.g. banking sector)  
 Industries which are important for national security (e.g.food, water, defence)  
 Industries with a high impact on global health and stability (eg pharmaceuticals, 
energy) 
 … Resulting in National or Supra-National Government intervention 
 
In short, where the laissez-faire free market is an inadequate determinant of fair practice 
and the stakes are too high to accept irresponsibility, intervention by an overarching 
public body is necessary. This changes the nature of the responsibility dynamic, and has 
been under-acknowledged previously. What we are accessing in Integrated Network 
Responsibility is not just legal compliance issues but the subcontracting of responsibility 
to a multiparty network, sometimes with one or two powerful players as agents of 
responsibility.  
 
In the current paper we have introduced Integrated Network Responsibility. This work 
opens up a wide range of future research areas. Further empirical work is needed to test 
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INR’s wider relevance. In our research three key parameters of network responsibility 
have been found to be management of power, nature of relationships and extended 
responsibility. Further research could test whether these issues are common to other 
network settings or are particular to the national lottery context. We have assumed a 
governing, public body as the influencing force requiring Integrated Network 
Responsibility, but it may be that other forces could have a similar effect, including for 
example large scale natural disasters (such as the Haiti earthquake of 2010), or 
overwhelming media or public pressure (such as the campaign to investigate politicians’ 
expense claim irregularities led by the UK newspaper The Telegraph). As society, media 
and commerce becomes increasingly globalised and integrated, it should also be 
considered to what extent the Integrated Network Responsibility concept can be applied 
beyond national borders and across sectors and society. It seems possible that Integrated 
Network Responsibility might have much wider applicability than the initial proposal we 
have presented here. Indeed in truly global challenges like climate change, poverty, social 
justice and health, anything less than a deeply and widely networked approach to 
responsibility, we contend, would be wholly inadequate. We urge researchers to 
investigate further the validity and applicability of Integrated Network Responsibility.  
 
We acknowledge the limitations of the study presented here. It is based on a relatively 
small number of interviews pertaining to a single case study company in a single sector, 
in a single country. Nevertheless, this high degree of focus has, we contend, enabled us to 
identify a conceptual lens which, we believe has potential to broaden the field and 
practice of social responsibility research.   
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Endnotes 
1. We follow Brammer et al’s (2011) lead and treat research on CSR and supply chains, 
business ethics and supply chains, and sustainability and supply chains as contributing to 
the same field, although we acknowledge that a finer grained analysis might dispute this 
amalgamation of sub-literatures. 
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